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Abstract
This paper presents an integrated view of economic growth, development traps, and
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1 Introduction
Economic geography is the sub…eld of economics that explains the location of produc-
tion factors in space. Growth theory is the sub…eld of economics that explains national
or regional income both across time and across countries or regions. The theory of
development traps explains why some countries or regions lack behind. In this paper,
we will explore the interrelation of these three sub…elds.1;2
Such an interrelation between growth theory, the location of manufacturing
industries, and the backwardness of some regions or countries has been discussed in-
formally among others by Myrdal and Kaldor. In particular, Myrdal (1957) observes
and explains disparities both in regional and in national incomes. Additionally, Kaldor
(1967) builds his growth theory upon Myrdal’s work being more explicit about under-
lying assumptions and transmission channels. We consider …ve stylised facts that may
capture the main theses of Myrdal (1957) and Kaldor (1967).
1) The same force that explains the agglomeration of economic activity in space
also explains national di¤erences in income.
“The international inequalities are, of course, not dissimilar from the
regional inequalities within a country. We will also …nd that there is a
close causal relation between the two.” (Myrdal, 1957, p. 10)
2) This force is based on the “principle of circular and cumulative causation”
(Myrdal, 1957, chapter 2). Myrdal describes this principle as a self-enforcing pro-
cess that is explicitly thought of as an unstable equilibrium of a dynamical system
that drives one country or region into a best position and another country or region
1Lucas (1988) also accounts for all three sub…elds at once. He starts out with a theory that …ts
the stylised facts of the US growth experience and explains within this setting 1) why income di¤ers
among countries, and 2) why international trade is not insuring convergence of income. Lucas (1988)
…nally points out that “a national economy is a completely arbitrary unit to consider” (p. 37) and
accounts in his setting for the formation of cities by human capital externalities. We will base our
model on an endogenous explanation, rather than an externality to explain many of the same stylised
facts.
2 Thereby we will follow a modeling approach that tries to capture many stylised facts in a model
mechanism that is as simple as possible. Of course, none of the stylised facts will be exclusively
explained by our model.
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into a worst position. Myrdal (1957, p. 27 ¤) notes further that migration, capital
movements, and trade may keep regional disparities growing.
3) The crucial assumption deviating from neoclassical theory is increasing re-
turns to scale production technology (Kaldor, 1967, lecture 1). Increasing returns
to scale applies, according to Kaldor, particularly to a wide range of manufacturing
industries and might become e¤ective not so much in terms of …rm size, but in terms
of process and product di¤erentiation.
“Economies of scale are derived not only from the expansion from any
single industry but from a general industrial expansion ...” (Kaldor, 1967,
p.14)
4) A possible transmission channel may be a terms-of-trade e¤ect.
“A cumulative process of the same general character, ..., will also be gen-
erated by a change in the terms of trade of a community or a region, if the
change is large and persistent enough ...” (Myrdal, 1957, p. 26)
5) Another possible part of a transmission channel may be internal capital
accumulation of a region or country that drives up the return on investment in the
faster growing regions relative to the slower growing regions. In this sense investment
projects may be complements, rather than substitutes.
“The establishment of a new business or the enlargement of an old one
widens the market for others, as does generally the increase of income and
demand. Rising pro…ts increase savings, but at the same time investments
go up still more, which again pushes up the demand and the level of prof-
its. And the expansion process creates external economies favourable for
sustaining its continuation.” (Myrdal, 1957, p. 25)
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We conclude: If the same force explains manufacturing industry agglomeration
and income disparities, this calls for a uni…ed approach of growth theory and economic
geography. We will set up a model that captures all the above …ve theses. This rises a
question: Why should one try to model income divergence? After all, the neoclassical
view of economic growth, i.e. (conditional) convergence of income at least among some
countries, has found large approval among mainstream economists.3
The recent empirical convergence literature is inconclusive of the (conditional)
convergence hypothesis (Barro, 1991, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, and Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil, 1992 and Cohen, 1996) or the club convergence hypothesis (Bau-
mol, et. al., 1989, Durlauf and Johnson, 1996, and Quah, 1996) for both country and
regional data sets. On the one hand, Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992),
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), and Cohen (1996) …nd that the average country or
region converges conditionally on structural characteristics of the economies. On the
other hand, Quah (1997) notes that the population of the converging regions/countries
might be double peaked, thus supporting the club convergence hypothesis which says
that initial conditions also matter. Additionally, Durlauf and Johnson (1995) reject the
conditional convergence hypothesis in favour of multiple regimes or stages of develop-
ment in a cross section analysis.4 Quah (1993) notes also that conditional convergence
of the average country in a regression analysis is compatible with outlier countries that
do not converge.5
The theory on development traps explains these countries that do not converge
to a “rich country” steady state.6 However, given that there is a theory on economic
growth that predicts conditional convergence, and a theory on development traps
3Independently of the empirical convergence literature, there is other empirical evidence support-
ing the neoclassical growth model. Jones (1995) and Levine and Renelt (1992) show that the time
series properties of endogenous growth models are inconsistent with the data and that the growth
regressions are unrobust with respect to most independent variables except investment. Furthermore,
Young (1995) shows that the East Asian growth miracles can be explained by factor accumulation in
the spirit of the neoclassical growth model, rather than by total factor productivity growth. However,
Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996) claim reduced empirical relevance of the Solow model on basis of
GMM-estimation.
4Jones (1997) adds that the relatively rich countries tend to converge, whereas the relatively poor
countries tend to converge from the US per capita income levels.
5The classical example is the Italian Mezzogiorno - a region of relative and absolute decline over
decades. See Rauch (1997).
6Surveys on poverty trap models are Azariadis (1996) and Galor (1996).
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that predicts some sort of divergence, one may pose the following question: When is a
country described by the …rst theory and when by the second? To answer this question,
a uni…ed approach may prove helpful having a “neoclassical regime” that has all
the properties of a neoclassical growth model, having a “poverty trap regime” that
explains backwardness, and having a testable condition under which one or the other
regime prevails. This paper attempts to provide such an approach.
Our …rst contribution will be to integrate Myrdal’s and Kaldor’s view on eco-
nomic growth, development traps and the location of production factors - summarized
in the …ve theses above - into mainstream economics without any sacri…ce of neoclas-
sical theory. Additionally, we will state a testable condition under which the one or
the other regime applies.
Our second contribution will be to focus on a new agglomeration process of
manufacturing industries among countries that is based on a mutual interaction with
capital accumulation and growth. Agglomeration of economic activity on di¤erent
levels like city, region, or nation may be explained by di¤erent agglomeration forces.7
Cities may be formed by localized intermediate inputs (Abdel-Rahman (1988), Fujita
(1988), Rivera-Batiz (1988), and in a growth setting Englmann and Walz (1995)).
Disparities among regions may be caused by factor movements such as worker mi-
gration (Krugman, 1991a), or forward and backward linkages caused by intermediate
goods (Venables, 1996). Internationally, frictionless factor movements are less likely
to happen than interregionally.8 But what causes then an unequal distribution of
manufacturing industries among countries? One answer is specialization of countries
in di¤erent sectors (e.g. Krugman and Venables, 1995); another one is information
externalities (Grossman and Helpman, 1991); and a third answer is R&D location
decisions (Martin and Ottaviano, 1996). The simplest explanation is, however, that
there are more manufacturing …rms in one country relative to another, because this
country has accumulated more capital. This alone does not su¢ce for an explanation.
7Fujita and Thisse (1996) survey the literature on agglomeration economics. We consider only
endogenous explanations in cumulative processes, such that completely identical countries end up
diverging from each other if there is just a small disturbance (idiosyncratic shock).
8See Krugman and Venables (1995).
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The missing part is how …rm agglomeration feeds back on diverging capital accumu-
lation. How does an increase of agglomeration lead to higher growth of a country
relative to another, and higher growth to even higher …rm agglomeration? We will
explain this feed-back with a terms-of-trade e¤ect.9
Our third contribution will be to explain how trade-liberalization triggers a
catch-up process. It is obvious that the agglomeration forces depend crucially on
the costs of bridging distances (e.g. transport cost, tari¤s, information costs, etc.),
because otherwise location does not matter. If agglomeration happens at a high level
of trade costs and convergence at a low level, and manufacturing agglomeration or
convergence feed through on growth, then we have established a (new) nexus between
trade-liberalization and growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives a brief verbal
description of the model and its mechanics, and compares related literature; section
3 gives the formal model set-up; section 4 solves the model for the steady states;
section 5 provides a stability analysis; section 5.1 discusses the neoclassical growth
regime; section 5.2 discusses the “poverty trap” regime; section 5.3 gives the model
implications for economic geography; and section 6 concludes.
2 A Brief Model Description
Our model is a synthesis of an economic geography model (Krugman, 1991a) and a
neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956, and others). There are two countries that have
a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition production sector with increasing
returns on plant level. Labour and capital are immobile. Capital is a durable goods
composite of all varieties. Investment is taken literally as foregone consumption. There
is intra-industry trade, although trade costs segment the product markets in the two
countries and trade is assumed to be balanced. Consequently, the only linkage between
the two countries are the terms of trade.
9An alternative nexus is given recently in Ben-David and Loewy (1998) based on cross-country
technology spillovers embedded in trade ‡ows.
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The mechanics of the model are best understood in a thought experiment.
Suppose two identical countries grow symmetrically having a capital stock of identical
size. For some reason (idiosyncratic shock), country 1’s capital stock grows faster than
country 2’s at one time period. This will increase the number of …rms in country 1
relative to country 2 given that output per …rm remains constant.10 Because of trade
costs, there is a home market bias in consumption of goods. Additionally, income
is higher in country 1, because there is more capital. Hence, there will be stronger
demand for any typical variety in country 1 relative to any typical variety in country
2, whereas relative supplies for a typical variety do not change. This will increase
country 1’s producer price of a typical variety relative to country 2’s (terms-of-trade
e¤ect).
The savings and investment decision in each country is based on the present
and future real interest rate which is equal to the real rental rate of capital. The real
rental rate in each country at a given point in time is in‡uenced by three e¤ects: (i)
The higher producer prices in country 1 allow ceteris paribus for higher rental rates in
country 1 (agglomeration force I). (ii) There are less goods to be imported in country
1. Therefore, there are less trade costs to be paid and the consumption price index is
thus lower in country 1. This means - everything else equal - that the real interest rate
is higher in country 1 (agglomeration force II). (iii) The capital-labor ratio is higher
in country 1. By capital-labour substitutability, this implies a higher wage-rental rate
in country 1 (convergence force). The net e¤ect of the three forces turns out to be
ambiguous and depends on the level of trade costs.
Suppose the real rental rate in country 1 decreases faster than the one in country
2 over the entire transition path towards the steady state (spatial substitutability of
investment). Then, investment will be lower in country 1 over the entire transition
path and the two capital stocks will eventually converge over time. This implies income
10This is a standard result in a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) set-up due to the assumption of CES utility
functions and constant variable cost. Suppose there is an expansion in total income. Then demand
for each single good is rising. This rises pro…ts for all (symmetric) …rms, because the …xed cost can
be spread over a larger output. However, the increase in pro…ts causes new …rms to enter, such that
the original increase in income is now spread over more goods. The amount of income spent on a
single good falls back to the original level. Therefore, output of a single …rm is a constant in this
set-up.
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convergence and describes thus the neoclassical regime. Suppose, on the contrary, that
the real rental rate decreases slower in country 1 than in country 2 over the entire time
path (spatial complementarity of investment). Then, future investment will be higher
in country 1. This increases further the terms of trade in country 1. Thus, the real
rental rate gap might become even bigger self-enforcing the faster capital accumulation
in country 1. The cumulative process will eventually stop as the convergence force will
begin to dominate at some degree of divergence. This implies income divergence and
describes thus the “poverty trap” regime. If in this regime the capital stock is higher in
country 1 at any point of time, then a …xed …rm size implies an agglomeration of …rms
in country 1. Hence, a new explanation for manufacturing industry agglomeration is
found that is based both on national capital accumulation and a terms-of-trade e¤ect
in a cumulative process.
Our model builds upon the literature on big push and poverty traps which was
promoted in an in‡uential formal model by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989). We
share the features of increasing returns technology and demand spillovers to trigger
self-enforcing growth processes. However, we pose this idea into an international
context allowing us to discuss the importance of trade barriers, and home-market size,
and the role of neighbouring countries in boosting or inhibiting growth.
Gali (1995) builds into a model with monopolistic competition an investment
complementarity by a competition e¤ect that drives a wedge between the physical
marginal product of capital and the marginal revenue product of capital. Instead
of the competition e¤ect in a closed economy, we use a terms-of-trade e¤ect in a
two country model to generate a relative investment complementarity rather than an
absolute one.11
Our model is also related to Baldwin, Forslid, and Haaland (1995) which in-
spired our model set-up and Baldwin and Seghezza (1996). These models have similar
production, consumption and market structures as ours. However, their focus is on
11That is a rise in the relative capital stock of two countries rises the ratio of real rental rates,
whereas in Gali (1995) an absolute rise in the capital stock rises (locally) the absolute value of the
real rental rate.
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dynamic gains of trade and on the investment creation of trade liberalization in the
symmetric country case. They rule out terms-of-trade e¤ects and exclude the cumu-
lative process that we focus on.12
3 The Model Set-up
There are two consumers which di¤er only by their place of residence in two countries
(j = 1; 2). A standard logarithmic intertemporal utility function Uj is assumed13 that
is de…ned on a consumption basket Cj:
Uj =
1Z
0
e¡¸t lnCjdt; (1)
where ¸ is the time preference rate, and t is a time index in continuous time.14 The
consumption basket Cj of a consumer j is of the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) type and is
de…ned on all domestic and foreign produced varieties with an elasticity of substitution
denoted ¾ (¾ > 1):
Cj =
0
@
njX
ij=1
c
¾¡1
¾
ijj
n1 + n2
+
nkX
ik=1
c
¾¡1
¾
ikj
n1 + n2
1
A
¾
¾¡1
; (2)
where the number of goods produced in country j are indexed ij = 1j ; :::; nj; and
cijj and cikj ; j; k = 1; 2; k = j; are consumer j’s consumption of the varieties ij and
ik produced in country j and k, respectively. Additionally, there is no international
borrowing and lending and trade will have to be balanced.15
12Very recently, Baldwin (1998), Baldwin, Martin, and Ottaviano (1998), and Baldwin and Forslid
(1997,1998) expell the same idea of bifurcation of income convergence/divergence behavior of two
economies in dependence of trade cost in a model with monopolistic competition and increasing
returns. However, our engine of growth is capital accumulation, and our convergence force Solow’s
(1956) capital-labor substitutability assumption, whereas the papers above use technological progress
as engine of growth and the extent of competition e¤ect of economic geography models (Krugman,
1991a) as convergence force. Consequently, trade openness triggers income divergence in Baldwin,
Martin, and Ottaviano (1998), whereas in our model trade openness triggers income convergence.
Also, a larger home market increases …rm pro…ts and R&D activity in the papers mentioned above,
whereas a larger home market induces a demand bias towards domestic goods and rises the domestic
terms of trade in our model.
13All results remain valid, if an isoelastic intertemporal utility function is used. However, mathe-
matical proofs would be more complicated.
14We suppress the time index whenever obvious.
15The assumption of balanced trade has a long tradition in the trade and growth literature: e.g.
Stiglitz (1970) and Grossman and Helpman (1991).
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With monopolistic competition, each variety ij will be produced by a di¤erent
…rm ij. Firms di¤er only by their location. Therefore, …rms within a country j are
symmetric and the index ij for …rm i in country j can be collapsed to j denoting a
typical …rm in country j: The production technology is a Cobb-Douglas production
function with …xed cost that gives rise to increasing returns to scale on plant level. In
particular, ® units of inputs vj in form of a basket of labour lj and capital kj are used
to install the production process every day (maintenance work) and ¯ units of the
input basket are used to produce each unit of goods for the domestic and the foreign
market xj:
vj = ®+ ¯xj and vj = k±j l1¡±j ; (3)
where ± (0 < ± < 1) denotes the income share of capital.16
We assume as in Baldwin, Forslid and Haaland (1995) that investment and
capital are the same composite of industrial goods as is consumption and goods can
be used both for consumption and investment:
Ij =
:
Kj=
0
@
njX
ij=1
¶
¾¡1
¾
ijj
n1 + n2
+
nkX
ik=1
¶
¾¡1
¾
ikj
n1 + n2
1
A
¾
¾¡1
; (4)
where Ij is the investment aggregate used by the …rms in country j to increase the
capital stock Kj of country j, a dot denotes the time derivative of a variable, and ¶ijj
and ¶ikj ; j; k = 1; 2; k = j; are demand of the …rms in country j for investment goods
produced by a …rm ij and ik in country j and k, respectively. A unit of capital, i.e. a
machine, may be assembled at zero cost in di¤erent ways from time-varying product
spaces, but once it is assembled it performes the same service. A larger product
space does not allow for more productive capital (no Smithian growth).17 Note that
we do not allow for the usual depreciation of capital. One can think of capital as a
16It will be this particular type of the production function that guarantees both constancy of factor
shares (Kaldor, 1963), and constant returns to scale on industry level (Burnside, 1996).
17Smithian growth, i.e. the cost reduction from larger market size and increased specialisation, is
discussed in Kelly (1997) in the context of economic geography and growth.
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durable composite of intermediate input goods that is permanently maintained. The
maintenance cost will show up in the …xed cost parameter ® of the production function.
Additionally, we assume free …rm entry and exit which keeps pro…ts at zero.
Production factors are immobile.18 For simplicity, labour supply is inelastic, equally
distributed among countries, and normalized to one19. Finally, there are trade costs
of the Samuelson iceberg-type, such that only a fraction ¿ of one produced unit of a
good arrives at its foreign destination (0 < ¿ < 1).
4 Equilibrium
The consumption maximization problem of the typical agents in country 1 and 2 may
be solved in two stages. First, the demand for any variety is determined for any given
time path of expenditure on consumption goods. The corresponding unit expenditure
function or ideal CES price index Pj is found to be:20
Pj =
Ã
njp1¡¾j
n1 + n2
+
nkpex(1¡¾)k
n1 + n2
! 1
1¡¾
; (5)
where pj and pexk are the domestic producer prices and export prices of …rms in country
j and k charged for consumers in country j, respectively. Then, the individual budget
constraint can be written as follows:21
¢
Kj= Ij =
rjKj
Pj
+ wj
Pj
¡ Cj; (6)
where rj and wj denote nominal rental and wage rates. Investment expenditure equals
wage income and rents minus consumption expenditure. Second, the optimal con-
18We make this assumption, because we want to distinguish our agglomeration process from that
of Krugman (1991a), Krugman and Venables (1995), Venables (1996), and Martin and Ottaviano
(1996). These papers rely on interregional or intersectoral factor (in particular labour) movements
and R&D location decisions.
19If we did not assume this normalization, then the capital stocks would simply be replaced by the
capital-labor ratios. None of the qualitative results obtained in this paper would change, of course.
20Note that we take here the symmetry of …rms within a country into account.
21We use the de…nition of the expenditure function (and an analogous equation for the investment
aggregate Ij):
PjCj ´
njX
ij=1
pjcijj+
nkX
ik=1
pexk cikj
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sumption expenditure is determined by maximizing utility (1) taking the individual
budget constraint (6), a price vector, and the initial condition as given. We assume
that private agents do not foresee the impact of their behaviour on decisions of agents
in the other country. This assumption excludes strategic interaction and is in line with
the monopolistic competition conjecture. The optimization yields the familiar Euler
equation:22
:
Cj=
¡
½j ¡ ¸
¢
Cj ; (7)
where ½j ´ rj=Pj denotes the real rental rate of capital. Additionally, the familiar
transversality condition completes the description of the dynamical system. Note that
the steady state condition of the emerging dynamical system will involve equalization
of real rental rates of capital across countries.
Firms maximize pro…ts and use a mark-up pricing rule given the imperfect
competition conjecture of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) that …rms take the direct impact
of their price decision on goods market demand into account, but not the indirect
e¤ects on income and the price index:23
pj =
¾
¾ ¡ 1¯c (wj ; rj) and p
ex
j =
¾
¾ ¡ 1¯c (wj ; rj) =¿ : (8)
It is important that prices for foreign consumers contain a transport-cost mark-up on
prices for domestic consumers. Furthermore, c (wj ; rj) denotes the unit cost function
which is given by the following expression:
c (wj ; rj) = (1 ¡ ±)±¡1 ±¡±r±jw1¡±j : (9)
Finally, the relative input demand determines after aggregation the wage-rental ratio
for a given capital-labour ratio (Recall that labour endowments are normalized to
one.):
wj
rj
=
1 ¡ ±
±
Kj : (10)
Capital letters denote aggregates (e.g. Kj ´ njkj and Vj ´ njvj). Additionally, the
zero pro…t condition njpjxj = rjKj +wj holds due to free …rm entry and exit. Hence,
22We follow the standard procedure as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
23For a discussion of this conjecture see d’Aspremont, et. al. (1996).
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we …nd from the zero pro…t condition and equation (10) that the rental payments are
a constant fraction of income:
rjKj = ±njpjxj : (11)
Using the zero pro…t condition, we derive the following equation for …rm output:24
xj =
_
x= 1; (12)
where we normalized without loss of generality ¯ = 1¡® and ®¾ = 1.25 Factor market
equilibrium requires:
nj = K±j = Vj : (13)
Thus, the number of …rms and goods depends on the capital stock of a country. The
goods market equilibrium condition for a typical …rm in country 1 at any point of time
is the last equilibrium condition to be imposed:26
p¡¾1 (r1K1 + w1)
n1p1¡¾1 + qn2p1¡¾2
+
qp¡¾1 (r2K2 + w2)
qn1p1¡¾1 + n2p1¡¾2
= 1: (14)
where q ´ ¿¾¡1 proxies the reciprocal of trade costs for notational simplicity. Using the
zero pro…t condition and de…ning relative producer prices (terms of trade) p ´ p2=p1
and relative …rm agglomeration n ´ n2=n1, equation (14) can be reformulated in the
following way:
1
1 + qnp1¡¾ +
qnp
q + np1¡¾ = 1; (15)
which can be solved for n to give two solutions n = 0 and
n = q ¡ p
¾
p (q ¡ p¡¾) with 0 < n <1: (16)
This simple equation gives a relationship between the terms of trade and relative …rm
agglomeration.
24For the derivation, we use the de…nition of Vj , equations (3) and (8), and c (wj ; rj)Vj = rjKj+wj
which is obtained by plugging (11) and its counterpart for labour demand into the de…nition of Vj ,
deviding through by c (wj ; rj), and applying the zero pro…t condition.
25All results of the model are independent of ® and ¯.
26Note that we exploit here the fact that the composition of consumption good and investment
good demand is irrelevant for goods market equilibrium, because we assumed investment and the
consumption basket to be of the same functional composite of goods.
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De…ning K ´ K2=K1, equation (13) may be restated in the following way:
n = K±: (17)
The degree of …rm agglomeration is determined by the relative size of capital stocks.
From now on, we can use …rm agglomeration n and relative capital stocks K inter-
changeably. Next, the relative consumption price index P (real exchange rate) of the
two countries can be written after some manipulations as:
P = p
¾
1¡¾ ; (18)
where we used (5) and (16). De…ne relative (nominal rental rates) r ´ r2=r1. Then,
it follows from (11), (13) and (17) that
r = pK±¡1 (19)
The relative (nominal) rental rate depends on two factors: the relative capital stocks
and the relative producer terms of trade. Now, we can summarize the factor and goods
market equilibrium conditions in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: For 0 < K 1 holds: the correspondence p = p (K) is an upward sloping
function below 1; P = P (K) is a downward sloping function above 1; r = r (K) is
bounded from below by p (K); Finally, lim
K!0 r (K) = 1.
Proof: See appendix 1. Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 can be shown in …gure 1 that depicts the terms of trade p (K), relative
rental rates r (K), and the relative consumption price index P (K) in dependence of
the degree of relative capital stocks K. Note additionally that relative capital stocks
K and …rm agglomeration n are proportional (equation (17)).
Figure 1 about here
If industries are partially agglomerated in country 1 (K < 1), then the terms of trade
p (K) are bigger in country 1, whereas the consumption price index P (K) is smaller.
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However, the relation of rental rates r (K) to relative capital stocks K may be am-
biguous.
These results re‡ect the interplay between terms of trade and agglomeration of
industries that is implicit in Krugman (1991a). Suppose, the economy starts from an
equal distribution of industries. Then, the relative distribution of production factors
changes, because one country is accumulating more capital. Consequently, there will
be more purchasing power in the larger country than in the smaller one. Because of
trade costs, demand for goods of a typical …rm is biased towards domestic …rms. This
implies that demand for goods of a typical …rm in the larger country exceeds the one
in the smaller country. However, supply of …rms is the same across all …rms in the
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework (see equation (12)). Thus, goods market clearing
requires that relative producer prices fall in the smaller country. The price movement
induces the exit of …rms in the smaller country and the entry of new …rms in the larger
(see equation (17)).
The consumption price index of a typical consumer in the large country is below
the one in the small country, although (factory gate) producer prices are higher in the
large country and a larger share of income is spent on domestic goods (See equation
(18)). This is so, because less goods have to be imported in the large country. Hence,
there are less goods a transport-cost mark-up has to be paid for. (See equation (8)).
In this sense, transport cost drive a wedge between relative (factory gate) producer
prices and relative consumption price indices.
The ambiguous impact of the distribution of the capital stock on rental rates
arises from a convergence force, i.e. capital substitutability, and from an agglomer-
ation force, i.e. the terms-of-trade e¤ect due to the agglomeration of manufacturing
industries. The rise in the capital-labour ratio will lower the rental rate relative to
the wage rate in the country with more capital; the rise in industrial agglomeration
rises the terms of trade in the bigger country and rises the overall factor payments in
factor market equilibrium including - in particular - rental rates (see equation (19)).
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We close the model by combining the goods and factor market equilibrium
conditions and the conditions from …rm optimization with the dynamical equations
from consumer optimization. Note that the intertemporal budget constraint (6) can
be reformulated to yield
¢
Kj=
njpj
Pj
¡ Cj = rjKj±Pj ¡ Cj; (20)
where equation (12) is used and the second equality sign follows from equation (11).
We note from (5), (11), (12), and (13), and Lemma 1 that the real rental rate of capital
in a country depends on the level of the two capital stocks in the two countries K1 and
K2 (½j ´ rj=Pj = ½j (K1; K2)). Then the model may be summarized in the following
4-dimensional, non-linear di¤erential equation system with the control variables C1
and C2; the state variables K1 and K2, the national budget constraints (20), and the
Euler equations (7):
:
K1 =
½1 (K1; K2)
±
K1 ¡ C1 (21)
:
C1 = (½1 (K1; K2) ¡ ¸)C1 (22)
:
K2 =
½2 (K1; K2)
±
K2 ¡ C2 (23)
:
C2 = (½2 (K1; K2) ¡ ¸)C2; (24)
where the transversality conditions are
lim
t!1 Kj (t)¹j (t) = 0 (25)
with the co-state variables ¹j (t) for (21) and (23), and the initial conditions are
Kj (0) = Ki0 (26)
for j = 1; 2.
Next, the steady states are calculated. Combining (22) and (24) requires ½ ´
½2=½1 = r (K) =P (K) = 1 in the steady state. First, we de…ne a benchmark value for
the reciprocal transport cost proxy q, such that
q¤ ´ (2¾ ¡ 1) (±¾ + 1 ¡ ¾)
±¾ ¡ (1 ¡ ¾) : (27)
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Then, we can formulate the following proposition on the equalization of real rental
rates of the two countries.
Proposition 1: (i) The steady state condition ½ (K) = 1 has the (trivial) symmetry
solution
_
K= 1, if q > q¤; moreover, it holds that d½(1)dK < 0 in this case.
(ii) The steady state condition ½ (K) = 1 has the solutions
_
K= fK¤; 1=K¤; 1g, if
q < q¤, where 0 < K¤ < 1; moreover, it holds that d½(1)dK > 0;
d½(K¤)
dK < 0; and
d½(1=K¤)
dK < 0 in this case.
Proof: See appendix 2.
There are two regimes depending on the level of trade costs, and one of the
two regimes expells multiple equilibria. The …rst regime will be called neoclassical
regime; the second regime will be called poverty trap regime, henceforth.
Trade costs drive a wedge between relative producer prices and consumption
price indices. If this wedge widens su¢ciently (q < q¤), the intermediate solution K¤
arises (see …gure 1). In this case, an increase of the capital stock in the largest country
rises the real rental rate above the one in the smallest country in the neighborhood
of a symmetric distribution of capital (d½ (1) =dK > 0). In this sense investment
projects are local complements in the poverty trap regime (spatial complementarity
of investment). If the wedge between producer prices and consumption price indices
is not su¢ciently large (q > q¤), then an increase of the capital stock in the biggest
country leads to a lower real rental rate than in the smallest country (d½ (1) =dK < 0).
In this sense investment projects are global substitutes in the neoclassical regime
(spatial substitutability of investment).
The steady state variables
_
K1;
_
C1;
_
K2;
_
C2 can be obtained as functions of
_
K.27
However, we will not focus on their values. For future reference, we will denote the
set of steady state vectors
_
x´ ( _K1;
_
C1;
_
K2;
_
C2) and the particular steady state vectors
27Bars denote steady state values of a variable. Caveat:
_
K denotes the set of all steady state
capital stocks (because there are multiple equilibria), whereas K¤ denotes a certain value for one
particular steady state capital stock.
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associated with
_
K= 1,
_
K= K¤ and
_
K= 1=K¤ by x¤; x¤¤; and x¤¤¤, respectively. If an
equation holds for any steady state vector, we will also use the notation
_
x.
Finally, we shall point at two interesting properties of the model. First, the
model relies on constant factor shares which is one of the stylised facts of growth theory
(Kaldor, 1963). Second, the aggregated industry production function njxj = K±jL1¡±j
exhibits constant returns to scale. Hence, the increasing returns to scale assumption on
plant level is in line with empirical evidence on the production technology on industry
level such as Burnside (1996).
5 Stability Analysis
We will not follow the standard procedure of a local stability analysis as in Dockner
(1985) for 4-dimensional, non-linear di¤erential equation systems, because the Jaco-
bian of the linnearized system cannot be signed unambiguously. Instead, we will …nd
a …rst-order approximation function for the system (21)-(24) that has (i) the same
steady state values, (ii) the same Jacobian matrix at the steady state values, and (iii)
the Jacobian matrix is unambiguously signed for any single entry. Finally, we use the
fact that the qualitative behaviour of the approximation system is equivalent to the
original system.
We take the di¤erence in the growth rates of the capital stocks and consumption
using (21)-(24).
¢
K2
K2
¡
¢
K1
K1
=
1
±
(½2 (K1;K2) ¡ ½1 (K1; K2)) ¡ C2K2 +
C1
K1
(28)
¢
C2
C2
¡
¢
C1
C1
= ½2 (K1;K2) ¡ ½1 (K1; K2)
We would like to express these equations in terms of relative capital and consumption.
For this purpose, we “guess” the following approximation function to the system (28):
¢
K
K
=
a1
±
ln ½ (K) ¡ a2 lnC + a2 lnK (29)
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¢
C
C
= a1 ln ½ (K) ;
where we de…ned C ´ C2=C1, a1 ´_½1, and a2 ´
_
C2 =
_
K2. This approximation is
entirely su¢cient to describe the behaviour of the terms of trade around the steady
state and to pin down the relation of all state variables (capital, income, and …rm
distribution) between the two countries around the steady state values.28 However,
for the approximation to be valid, we need to show that the approximation (29) is
chosen such that this system has the same steady states and the same qualitative
dynamic behaviour as the original system (28). The …rst property is easily con…rmed,
whereas the second is proven in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: The Jacobian matrix of the dynamical system (29), (21), and (22) eval-
uated at any of the steady states has the same eigenvalues as the Jacobian matrix of
the dynamical system (21)-(24).
Proof: See appendix 3. Q.E.D.
This lemma will be used for the local stability analysis that is summarized in
the next proposition.
Proposition 2: Consider the dynamical system (21)-(26). Assume that the eigenval-
ues are distinct. Then, this system is locally asymptotically stable if either
(i) q > q¤ and
_
K= 1 or
(ii) q < q¤ and
_
K= K¤ or
(iii) q < q¤ and
_
K= 1=K¤.
Furthermore, there exist three corresponding two-dimensional local stable manifolds
W sloc (x¤) ; W sloc (x¤¤) ; and W sloc (x¤¤¤). On the contrary, the dynamical system (21)-
(26) has a one-dimensional local stable manifold W sloc (x¤), if
28To recover the absolute values of the state variables, two more equations are necessary: e.g. the
dynamical equations governing country 1. We skip them to focus on the idea of the solution method,
but use them in the rigorous mathematical derivation in Lemma 2 and appendix 3.
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(iv) q < q¤ and
_
K= 1.
This local stable manifold is described by K1 (t) = K2 (t) and C1 (t) = C2 (t) for
0 t 1.
Proof: See appendix 4.
Proposition 2 resembles a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation with the bifurca-
tion parameter q and the bifurcation point q = q¤: We illustrate this in the following
bifurcation diagram.
Figure 2 about here
The vertical axes shows the position of steady state equilibria in terms of the relative
distribution of capital; the horizontal axes shows the level of trade costs. At a high
level of trade costs (low q), there are three steady states with the symmetric one
(
_
K= 1) being unstable (poverty trap regime). At a low level of trade costs (high q),
there is only one stable steady state equilibrium at a symmetric distribution of capital
(neoclassical regime).
The poverty trap regime emerges if and only if investment projects become
locally complementary in the neighborhood of a symmetric distribution of capital and
…rms.29 Around a symmetric distribution of capital, an increase of investment in
one country relative to the other increases, rather than decreases, the relative real
marginal productivity of capital in terms of the consumer price indices inducing more
investment to take place in the former than in the latter country. At some degree of
divergence in capital stocks and …rm distribution the divergence process stops, because
investment projects have become locally substitutes. A further rise of investment in
the booming country lowers the real marginal productivity of capital relative to the
declining country. Therefore the divergence process remains incomplete and a certain
asymmetric distribution of capital and …rms is a stable equilibrium.
29This follows immediately from the proof of proposition 2 in appendix 4, equations (71)-(74).
Note that the investment complementarity is referring to the ratio of capital stocks and the ratio of
real rental rates rather than to their absolute values as in the closed economy model of Gali (1995).
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The neoclassical regime emerges on the contrary, if investment projects are
globally substitutes, i.e. a relative rise in investment of one country above investment
in the other lowers the real marginal product of capital in the former relative to the
latter country. Therefore, only the symmetric distribution of capital can be a stable
steady state. Given that there can exist multiple stable local manifolds, it is important
to examine one aspect of global stability.
Proposition 3: Consider the dynamical system (21)-(26) and the case q < q¤: For any
given combination of initial conditions K10;K20 2 R+, there exists a unique perfect
foresight path for the two control variables C1 and C2. Furthermore, x¤ is reached, if
K10 = K20; x¤¤ is reached, if K10 > K20; x¤¤¤ is reached, if K10 < K20;
Proof: See appendix 5. Q.E.D.
This proposition ensures that there exists a unique perfect foresight path. Only
one of the three steady states can be reached for any given combination of initial
conditions. Therefore, this model does not exhibit expectations driven agglomeration
processes as have been found in other dynamic models with increasing returns to scale
like Matsuyama (1991), Krugman (1991b), and Kaneda (1995). In particular, we do
not need any additional coordination mechanism of expectations as Kaneda’s (1995)
assumption of “euphoric expectations” to select among multiple perfect foresight path.
5.1 The Neoclassical Growth Regime
In this section we discuss in detail the neoclassical regime, i.e. the case where trade
costs are relatively low (q > q¤). Recall that there is one steady state distribution of
capital
_
K= 1. We summarize our results:
Result 1: The neoclassical regime (q > q¤) exhibits outphasing growth and conver-
gence of income.30
The dynamic adjustment path is shown in …gure 3.
30This follows from proposition 2: the steady state is stable and the relative capital stock approaches
one. However, income is a monotone, increasing function of the capital stock.
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Figure 3 about here
The …gure presents the unique stable manifold of the 4 dimensional di¤erential equa-
tion system (21)-(26). In particular, there is a unique mapping from the state space
K2 ¡K1 to the control variable space C2 ¡C1 which follows from the stable manifold
theorem (see proposition 2). Even if two structurally identical countries start out with
dissimilar capital stocks, i.e. one country is poor and the other is rich, there will be
convergence of capital stocks and per capita income. The poorer country will grow
faster than the richer country in the transition period to the steady state.
Our neoclassical growth regime di¤ers from, e.g., a Solow or a Ramsey model
(without technological progress and population growth) by a di¤erent adjustment
path. Thus, countries that catch-up do not follow the same path as the leading
countries. History does not repeat, as is the case in the Solow and Ramsey model.
Once some country is ahead, the catch-up process will change terms of trade and the
real marginal product of capital. This will foster income growth of the country lacking
behind beyond what is predicted by a model with two isolated Ramsey economies. In
this sense, the speed of convergence is higher in our neoclassical regime than in the
isolated Ramsey economies.
Empirically, it is hard to “detect” the terms-of-trade e¤ect caused by an invest-
ment boom, because any terms-of-trade e¤ect due to total factor productivity growth
(which is excluded in our model) has to be controlled for. Note that in our model the
country that is growing fastest improves its terms of trade, because the home market
e¤ect together with trade costs causes a demand bias towards domestic goods at a
given supply. If total factor productivity growth were the reason for di¤erent growth
rates, then the faster growing economy is deteriorating its terms of trade, because
a rise in total factor productivity rises output and decreases its relative price.31 In
a complementary study, Urban (1998) tests the terms-of-trade e¤ect for the US and
31This is, for example, the case in Osang and Pereira (1997) which is a two-country, human capital
driven endogenous growth model with two sectors, balanced trade, and complete specialization.
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Japan from 1957 until 1990 and …nds weak evidence in favour of our model during the
‡exible exchange rate regime after Bretton-Woods using cointegration techniques.32
Furthermore, our model predicts that trade-liberalization triggers a convergence
process eliminating poverty traps, if q passes the threshold q¤. This adds qualitatively
a new dimension to the relation between trade openness and growth as described
by dynamic e¢ciency gains (Baldwin, 1992, and Baldwin and Seghezza, 1996). The
bifurcation property of trade openness is in line with the …nding of Ben-David (1993)
who shows: 1) There is absolute convergence of income in an economy with trade
liberalization (EEC633 from 1959-1968, EEC334 after the mid-sixties, USA and Canada
after the Kennedy Round Agreement), or with trade and factor market integration
(the convergence of the US states). 2) There is no absolute convergence of economies
that are not integrated (e.g. the EEC6 and the EEC3 before trade liberalization, the
25 most developed countries, or the “whole world”).35 Therefore, this evidence points
to a two regime scenario with trade liberalization being the bifurcation parameter as
suggested by our model.36
Next, our model explains the catch-up process by increased capital accumula-
tion that is triggered by trade liberalization. It has been noted by Young (1995) that
factor accumulation rather than total factor productivity growth explains the East
32A positive relation between GDP and international price levels can also be inferred from the
cross-country price data of Summers and Heston (1991). Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) show that
GDP growth and terms of trade are positively correlated. (Note that the original estimates in Barro
and Lee, 1994, are revised.) Because Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) try to capture all structural
characteristics of the economies, we may take this as weak evidence that not di¤erences in structural
characteristics that may in‡uence total factor productivity explain the impact of terms of trade on
growth. However, the estimates of Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995) may fail the robustness test of
Levine and Renelt (1992).
33This is the group of countries consisting of France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, and Italy.
34This is the group of countries consisting of Denmark, Ireland, and UK.
35If there is conditional convergence among the EEC6 (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992), but not
absolute convergence, then factors other than capital accumulation must drive income convergence.
If trade liberalization causes absolute convergence, then trade liberalization must have caused a
catch-up in capital stocks. This is the transmission channel in our model.
36The role of trade openness as bifurcation parameter may be reversed, if di¤erent convergence
forces are chosen (see section 5.3). Rauch (1997) gives the examples of Chile 1974-79 and of Italy’s
political uni…cation 1861, and explains the subsequent economic slumps in an endogenous growth
model.
In the relation of trade liberalization and growth, our model deviates in spirit from Myrdal (1957).
“The hampering of industrial growth in the poorer southern provinces of Italy, caused by the pulling
down of internal tari¤ walls after Italy’s political uni…cation in the last century, is a case in point
which has been thoroughly studied ...” (p. 28)
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Asian growth miracles. Furthermore, Levine and Renelt (1992) show that the im-
pact of openness on growth stems from investment promotion, not from productivity
growth. Finally, Moreno and Trehan (1997) …nd an empirical link between market
size and investment supporting the theoretical link between home-market e¤ect and
capital accumulation of our model.
5.2 The Poverty Trap Regime
In this section we discuss in detail the poverty-trap regime, i.e. the case where trade
costs are relatively high ( q < q¤). Recall that there are three steady state distributions
of capital, one of which is unstable. We summarize our results:
Result 2: In the poverty trap regime ( q < q¤), income levels tend to diverge mono-
tonically up to some relative ratio Y ¤ = K¤±, if country 2 is taken to be the smaller
country.37
The poverty trap case is graphically exposed in …gure 4 which is drawn in line
with propositions 2 and 3. The …gure shows the map of the state space (initial capital
distribution) on the control variable space (consumption choices) belonging to the
three local stable manifolds W sloc (x¤) ; W sloc (x¤¤) ; and W sloc (x¤¤¤) which are related to
the three steady-state vectors x¤; x¤¤, and x¤¤¤, respectively.
Figure 4 about here
Proposition 3 ensures that, for K1 (0) = K2 (0) ; consumption is chosen in line with
the stable manifold W sloc (x¤) that leads to the symmetric steady state x¤; if K1 (0) >
K2 (0) ; consumption is chosen in line with the stable manifold W sloc (x¤¤) that leads to
the steady state x¤¤ with more capital in country 1; if K1 (0) < K2 (0) ; consumption
is chosen in line with the stable manifold W sloc (x¤¤¤) that leads to the steady state
x¤¤¤ with more capital in country 2. Because W sloc (x¤) is one-dimensional, any slight
disturbance of this symmetric growth path, in the sense that one country accumulates
37The statement follows from proposition 2 that shows the divergence of the capital stocks and
from the fact that national income is a monotonic function of capital.
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more capital at some time period (idiosyncratic shock), will leave the symmetric steady
state unachievable. Capital stocks and income will diverge governed by one of the
other two stable manifolds depending on which country received a positive or negative
idiosyncratic shock.38
Our model can be distinguished from most of the poverty trap models in a
growth setting by explaining income divergence of two countries even though initial
conditions are the same except for an idiosyncratic shock. In other words, the ratio of
initial conditions matters, not the initial conditions themselves. This has two implica-
tions. First, poverty trap models where absolute values of initial conditions matter39
have di¢culties explaining how the rich countries left the poverty trap, whereas the
poor countries did not, if all countries started from roughly the same income levels,
say in the 17th/18th century.40 Our model allows some countries to become rich,
and others, that are hit by some negative idiosyncratic shock, stay poor. Second, our
model is especially suited for explaining the fall-back of highly developed countries like
the United Kingdom and Argentina after the turn of the century relative to countries
that had initially the same state of development.41 A wide range of “leapfrogging”
models exist that are often based on endogenous growth settings.42 We show that a
neoclassical growth setting can also account for the fall-back of nations, if they are hit
by some su¢ciently large exogenous shock. There is still one observation to be made
concerning the terms of trade.
Result 3: In the poverty trap regime ( q < q¤), there is a worsening of the terms of
trade p (t) over time in the country that lags behind vis a vis the country that is ahead,
38We cannot accomplish a global dynamic analysis, but numerical simulations suggest that a typical
divergence path would stay close to the symmetric growth path for a long time after an idiosyncratic
shock has occured and will eventually lead to a drastic relative and absolute decline in the country
that was originally hit.
39These are the poverty trap models corresponding to the club convergence hypothesis. A de…nition
and an overview of convergence hypotheses is given by Galor (1996).
40“The very fact that the world at present is so sharply divided between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries
is, in the context of the broad sweep of history, something relatively new: it is the cumulative result
of the historical experience of two or three hundred years. If we go back a few hundred years for
example, to 1700 or 1750, we do not …nd, as far as we can tell, such large di¤erences in real income
per capita between di¤erent countries or regions.” Kaldor (1967, p.3)
41We may then interpretate the idiosyncratic shock as political turmoil, unfavourable price move-
ments of primary products, and import substitution policy in the case of Argentina and as the loss
of colonies in the case of the United Kingdom.
42An example is Grossman and Helpman (1991).
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where terms of trade are de…ned in fob-manufacturing-producer prices.43
There has been an extensive discussion in the 50ies, whether developing coun-
tries faced a persistent worsening of their terms of trade from 1870 til 1938.44 Although
- strictly speaking - our model is only suitable to developing countries whose export
goods are produced with increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition45,
our model suggests that a worsening of the terms of trade was in principle explicable,
whenever investment projects were locally complements and capital accumulation was
poor.46 Our model suggests that the appropriate policy meassure was not to close
national markets (import substitution) despite that trade seemed to harm developing
countries, but to open national markets in order to eliminate the underlying poverty
trap - a recommendation that …nds broad consensus nowadays.
5.3 Economic Geography
Having shown the interdependence between real marginal product of capital, capital
accumulation, and terms of trade, we focus now on the aspect of agglomeration of
manufacturing industries. From the analysis so far it follows immediately (by equation
(17)) that the faster growth in the country with more capital causes a larger number of
…rms which we take as a proxy for manufacturing industry agglomeration. A relative
increase in domestic capital increases domestic income, which in turn increases demand
for any existing domestic variety. The latter increases domestic producer prices relative
to foreign (terms-of-trade e¤ect), which leads to positive pro…ts of domestic …rms and
thus the entry of new domestic …rms.
43Suppose country 2 lacks behind. From proposition 2 follows that the relative capital stock K (t)
approaches assymptotically K¤ < 1. From numerical simulations can be inferred that K (t) changes
monotonically. From Lemma 1 follows that p (t) is monotonically increasing with K (t). Therefore,
the time path for p (t) has the same qualitative properties as the time path for K (t) :
44An empirical survey is Spraos (1980).
45Spraos (1980) indicates: “Perhaps more important than any of these is the processing of primary
products before shipment (for instance, cocoa beans turned into cocoa butter and cocoa paste) which
has been increasing all the time, though in developing countries it had gained great momentum only
in the last twenty years.” (p. 118) Additionally, mining and agro-business may not a priori be less
likely described by increasing returns to scale than manufacturing industries.
46Of course, we do not doubt that other explanations can be found. We just want to point out that
the terms of trade e¤ect in our poverty trap regime does not run counter to the empirical literature.
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Result 4: At high trade costs ( q < q¤), there will be partial agglomeration of manu-
facturing industries in one country.47
Hence, a low growth rate is associated with a decline of manufacturing indus-
tries. Indeed, slower growth and a decline of manufacturing industries self-enforce each
other in a cumulative process. Conversely, agglomeration of manufacturing industries
is explained by faster capital accumulation in one country relative to another. This
explanation di¤ers from other explanations in papers on agglomeration and growth
- as Bertola (1992), Englmann and Walz (1995), and Martin and Ottaviano (1996).
In these papers, agglomeration processes in growth models rely on migration, capital
‡ows with technological spill-overs, and R&D location decisions.
The role of trade costs for triggering agglomeration is reversed compared to
Krugman (1991a). This is so, because we exchanged the convergence forces. Krug-
man’s (1991a) convergence force is based on ambiguous terms-of-trade e¤ects caused
by an immobile farming sector. As trade costs increase from a very low level, terms
of trade increase in the larger country. (We observed the same e¤ect in our model.)
However, as trade costs increase further in Krugman (1991a), terms of trade may start
to decrease. This e¤ect is not present in our model. We conclude therefore that the
role of trade costs is not robust with respect to the speci…c convergence force used in
geography and trade models.
6 Conclusion
We argued that relative income growth andmanufacturing industry distribution among
countries are mutually in‡uencing each other. This hypothesis has been formulated
by Myrdal (1957) and Kaldor (1967). They argue that a cumulative process may keep
some countries poor and others rich, because an expansion process (decline) may rise
(lower) the return on investment in the expanding (declining) country thus causing
further expansion (contraction) by capital accumulation. The empirical convergence
47This follows from result 2 and from equation (17).
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debate suggests, however, that income divergence is a possible, but not a general phe-
nomenon. Therefore, we built a model that explains income divergence in a poverty
trap regime, income convergence in a neoclassical regime, and a testable condition
under which a country is in one or the other regime. This condition depends on the
degree of integration in product markets. If trade barriers are high, income divergence
is likely to occur. If trade barriers are low, income convergence is the unique equilib-
rium. Thus, trade liberalization may trigger a catch-up process of countries that are
stuck in a poverty trap.
The interrelation of growth and agglomeration is described by circular causa-
tion. Countries grow faster (slower), because they have a lot of (a few) manufacturing
industries. Countries have a lot of (a few) manufacturing industries, because they have
grown faster (slower) in the past and thereby accumulated more (less) capital. The
circular causation relies on a terms-of-trade e¤ect that may or may not feed through
on real rental rates (spatial complementarity or substitutability of investment). The
countries stuck in the poverty trap experience slower growth, a lower investment-
to-GDP ratio, a worsening of their terms of trade, and a decline in manufacturing
industries. The countries that catch-up experience a higher growth rate, a higher
investment-to-GDP ratio, an improvement of their terms of trade, and manufacturing
industries di¤use to the poor country.
The results in this paper have been derived in a speci…c model set-up - increas-
ing returns, and monopolistic competition. Following the same sort of argument as
Gali (1994) for a closed economy, the pitchfork-bifurcation property may also appear
in a set-up with Cournot oligopoly. Our analysis shows that divergence of income and
…rm agglomeration emerge, whenever investment projects are complementary in the
neighborhood of a symmetric distribution of capital and …rms.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1.
Taking the derivative of (16) yields:
dn
dp
= ¡¾p
¾ (q ¡ p¡¾) ¡ (q ¡ p¾) (q ¡ (1 ¡ ¾) p¡¾)
p2 (q ¡ p¡¾)2 (30)
with 0 < n < 1: (a) Suppose p > 1, then q ¡ p¾ < 0. Therefore, q ¡ p¡¾ < 0 for n to
be positive by inspection of (16). Then follows by inspection of (30) that dn=dp > 0,
because ¾ > 1 by assumption. (b) Suppose p < 1, then q ¡ p¡¾ < 0. Therefore,
q¡p¾ < 0 for n to be positive by inspection of (16). Then follows by inspection of (30)
that dn=dp > 0, because ¾ > 1 by assumption. This implies that the invers function
p ! n exists in the positive range. From (17) follows that K and n are proportional.
Hence, we have that p (K) is an invertible function and dp=dK > 0. P (K) must then
be downward sloping from (18). From (19) follows that r (K) is bounded from below
by p (K). Finally, the limit with respect to complete agglomeration (K ! 0) can be
taken from (19). Q.E.D.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1.
We will …rst show that there are at most 3 solutions to ½ (K) ´ r (K) =P (K) = 1.
Using equations (18) and (19) yields:
r=P = pn
±¡1
± p
¾
1¡¾ = 1: (31)
Plugging in the goods market equilibrium condition (16) yields:
p
1
1¡¾
µ
q ¡ p¾
p (q ¡ p¡¾)
¶ ±¡1
±
= 1: (32)
Multiplying out gives a power function of the form:
q ¡ p¾ ¡ qp 1¡¾+¾±(1¡¾)(1¡±) + p (1¡¾)
2(1¡±)+±
(1¡¾)(1¡±) = 0: (33)
This expression has at most 3 solutions for p due to Descartes’ Rule of Sign. Because
there is a one-to-one mapping from p to n to K (Lemma 1), there correspond at
most three values for n and K. We conclude: one solution is K = 1 (The symmetry
solution is always true.); if there exists a second solution K¤ < 1, then the third must
be (1=K¤) > 1 because of the symmetry of the model.
Now, we will give a necessary and su¢cient condition for the existence of K¤ by
restricting our view on 0 < K 1. Recall from Lemma 1: lim
K!0 r (K) = 1, whereas
P (0) is …nite. Hence,
lim
K!0 ½ (K) ´ limK!0
r (K)
P (K)
> 1: (34)
There will exist the interior solution K¤, if ½ (K) < 1 for K slightly below 1 (interme-
diate value theorem). This is not just a necessary condition for the existence of K¤,
but also a su¢cient condition for K¤ to be the only interior solution (0 < K¤ < 1),
because ½ (1) = 1. (Suppose on the contrary that K¤ exists and ½ (K) > 1; when
K is slightly below 1, then there will exist at least two interior solutions (or none)
for 0 < K < 1 which contradicts our …ndings above.) From ( 17) follows that there
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corresponds a n¤ = K¤±: We can formulate the necessary and su¢cient condition for
an interior solution n¤ also in the following way:
dP (1)
dn
< dr (1)
dn
: (35)
Evaluating the derivative of the relative price index yields:
dP (n)
dn
= ¾
1 ¡ ¾
dp (n)
dn
: (36)
Evaluating this expression at n = 1 and using equation (30) gives us:
dP (1)
dn
= ¾
1 ¡ ¾
q ¡ 1
1 ¡ 2¾ ¡ q : (37)
Next, the derivative of relative rental rates is found:
dr (n)
dn
= dp (n)
dn
n
±¡1
± + p
µ
± ¡ 1
±
¶
n¡ 1± : (38)
We evaluate this expression at n = 1 by using (30):
dr (1)
dn
=
q ¡ 1
1 ¡ 2¾ ¡ q +
± ¡ 1
±
: (39)
Using (37) and (39) in (35) yields an inequality
q ¡ 1
1¡ q ¡ 2¾
2¾ ¡ 1
1 ¡ ¾ <
± ¡ 1
±
; (40)
which can be solved for q:
q < q¤ ´ (2¾ ¡ 1) (±¾ + 1 ¡ ¾)
±¾ ¡ (1 ¡ ¾) < 1: (41)
A similar argumentation holds for 1=n¤ and 1 n < 1, i.e. 1=K¤ and 1 K < 1,
by the symmetry property of the model.
Finally, the derivative in (i) follows from ½ (1) = 1; ½ (K) > 1, ifK < 1; and ½ (K) < 1,
if K > 1. Correspondingly, the derivatives in (ii) follow from ½ (1) = ½ (K¤) = 1; and
½ (K) > 1, if K < K¤ or K > 1=K¤; ½ (K) < 1, if 1 > K > K¤ or 1=K¤ > K > 1.
(See Lemma 1). Q.E.D.
Appendix 3: Proof of Lemma 2.
Let x ´ (K1; C1;K2; C2) and the dynamical system (21)-(24) be written in matrix
notation as :x= f (x). Furthermore, let y ´ (lnC; lnK;K1; C1) and
g (y) ´
0
BBB@
a1 ln ½ (K)
a1
± ln ½ (K) ¡ a2 lnC + a2 lnKv½1(K1;K)
± K1 ¡ C1³v½1 (K1; K) ¡ ¸
´
C1
1
CCCA ; (42)
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where we use
½1 (K1; K2) =
s½1 (K1; K) ´ ±K±¡11
Ã
1
1 +K±
+
qp (K)1¡¾
1 +K¡±
! 1
¾¡1
; (43)
with @ h½1 =@K1 < 0, which follows from (5), (11), (12), and (13).48 De…ne the
invertible matrix h in the following way:
h ´
0
BBB@
0 ¡ 1_
C1
0 1_
C2¡ 1_
K1
0 1_
K2
0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
1
CCCA : (44)
Then, we …nd for x and y in the neighborhood of
_
x and
_
y that
hx =
0
BBBB@
C2¡
_
C2_
C2
¡ C1¡
_
C1_
C1
K2¡
_
K2_
K2
¡ K1¡
_
K1_
K1
K1
C1
1
CCCCA
t
0
BB@
lnC
lnK
K1
C1
1
CCA ´ y; (45)
where we used the …rst-order Taylor expansions
lnK2 ¡ lnK1 t 1_
K2
³
K2¡
_
K2
´
¡ 1_
K1
³
K1¡
_
K1
´
(46)
lnC2 ¡ lnC1 t 1_
C2
³
C2¡
_
C2
´
¡ 1_
C1
³
C1¡
_
C1
´
around the steady state vector
_
x. Furthermore, we calculate the Jacobian Matrix
B ´ dg(
_
y)
dx evaluated at the steady state vector
_
y:
dg
³_
y
´
dx
=
0
BBBBB@
³
@
_
½2
@K1 ¡ @
_
½1
@K1
´
0
³
@
_
½2
@K2 ¡ @
_
½1
@K2
´
0
1
±
³
@
_
½2
@K1 ¡ @
_
½1
@K1
´
¡
_
C1_
K
2
1
1_
K1
1
±
³
@
_
½2
@K2 ¡ @
_
½1
@K2
´
¡
_
C2_
K
2
2
¡ 1_
K2
@
_
½1
@K1
_
K1
± +
_
½1
± ¡1 @
_
½1
@K2
_
K1
± 0_
C1 @
_
½1
@K1 0
_
C1 @
_
½1
@K2 0
1
CCCCCA
; (47)
where we used the steady state conditions of (28), i.e.
_
½1 =
_
½2; (48)_
C1
_
K1
=
_
C2
_
K2
; (49)
and by the rules of di¤erentiation and (43):
@ ln
_
½
@Ki
= 1_
½2
@
_
½2
@Ki
¡ 1_
½1
@
_
½1
@Ki
; (50)
48Recall that bars denote steady state values of any steady state solution.
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d h½1
dKi
= @
_
½1
@Ki
; (51)
@ ln
_
K
@K1
= ¡ 1_
K1
; (52)
@ ln
_
K
@K2
= ¡ 1_
K2
; (53)
@ ln
_
C
@C1
= ¡ 1_
C1
; (54)
@ ln
_
C
@C2
= 1_
C2
: (55)
Correspondingly, the Jacobian A ´ df(
_
x)
dx can be found from the linnearization of the
dynamical system (21)-(24) around the steady state vectors
_
x:
df
¡_
x
¢
dx
=
0
BBBB@
_
K1
±
@
_
½1
@K1 +
_
½1
± ¡1
_
K1
±
@
_
½1
@K2 0_
C1 @
_
½1
@K1 0
_
C1 @
_
½1
@K2 0
@
_
½2
@K1
_
K2
± 0
_
K2
±
@
_
½2
@K2 +
_
½2
± ¡1_
C2 @
_
½2
@K1 0
_
C2 @
_
½2
@K2 0
1
CCCCA
: (56)
It can be checked that
dg
³_
y
´
dx
= h
df
¡_
x
¢
dx
; (57)
where we used (50) and _
Ci
_
Ki
=
_
½i
±
(58)
for i = 1; 2, which follows from the steady state conditions of (21) and (23).
Now, we show that the Jacobian A ´ df(
_
x)
dx and the Jacobian B ´ dg(
_
y)
dy are similar
matrices.49 Therefore, we need one more preliminary calculation. From the chain rule
of matrix di¤erentiation and (45) follows:
dg
³_
y
´
dx
=
dg
¡
h
_
x
¢
dx
=
dg
³_
y
´
dy
h: (59)
Because h is invertible, we can write:
dg
³_
y
´
dy
=
dg
³_
y
´
dx
h¡1: (60)
Then, we may rewrite the Jacobian B in the following way:
B ´
dg
³_
y
´
dy
=
dg
³_
y
´
dx
h¡1 = h
df
¡_
x
¢
dx
h¡1 ´ hAh¡1; (61)
49De…nition: If A and B are square matrices, we say that B is similar to A, if there is an invertible
matrix h such that B = hAh¡1. (Brock and Malliaris, 1989, p.349)
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where the …rst equality sign follows from (60), the second equality sign follows from
(57), and the second identity follows from the de…nition of A. Therefore, the matrices
A and B are similar. However, two similar square matrices A and B have the same
characteristic polynomials and eigenvalues (Theorem 4.1 in Brock and Malliaris, 1989,
p.349), i.e.
jA¡ ³I4j = jB ¡ ³I4j = 0; (62)
where ³ denotes the eigenvector and I4 the 4 £ 4 identity matrix. This concludes the
proof. Q.E.D.
Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 2.
Consider the Taylor linnearization of the system (29), (21), and (22), i.e.
:y= B
³
y¡ _y
´
; (63)
where y ´ (lnC; lnK;K1; C1), B ´ dg(
_
y)
dy and g (y) is de…ned in equation (42) of
appendix 3. The characteristic polynomial of the matrix B is found:
jB ¡ ³I4j =
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯
¡³ a1 d
_
½
dK
_
K 0 0
¡a2 a1± d
_
½
dK
_
K +a2 ¡ ³ 0 0
0 @
h½1
@K
_
K1
±
@h½1
@K
_
K1+
_
½1
± ¡ ³ ¡1
0
_
C1 @
h½1
@K
_
C1 @
h½1
@K1 ¡³
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯
= 0; (64)
where ³ denotes the eigenvector and I4 the 4 £ 4 identity matrix. Next, a Gauss-
transformation with the Pivotelements (1,1) and (3,4) is undertaken and the second
column is changed with the …rst to form a matrix in Gauss-form:
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯
a3 0 0 0
a1
±
d
_
½
dK
_
K +a2 ¡ ³ ¡a2 0 0
0 a4 a5 0
0
_
C1 @
h½1
@K
_
C1 @
h½1
@K1 ¡³
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯¯
¯
= 0; (65)
where we de…ned
a3 ´ a1 d
_
½
dK
_
K ¡ ³a2
µ
a1
±
d
_
½
dK
_
K +a2 ¡ ³
¶
;
a4 ´ ¡
_
C1
³
@ h½1
@K
+
@ h½1
@K
_
K1
±
;
a5 ´
0
@
@h½1
@K
_
K1 +
_
½1
±
¡ ³
1
A¡
_
C1
³
@ h½1
@K1
:
Because the determinant of a matrix in Gauss form is the product of its diagonal
elements, the characteristic polynomial may be written in the following way:
³2 ¡ ³
µ
a1
±
d
_
½
dK
_
K +a2
¶
+ a1a2
d
_
½
dK
_
K= 0 (66)
or
³2 ¡ ³
±
Ã
@ h½1
@K
_
K1 +
_
½1
!
¡ _C1 @
h½1
@K1
= 0: (67)
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Correspondingly, the 4 eigenvalues are:
³1;2 = 0:5
µ
a1
±
d
_
½
dK
_
K +a2
¶
(68)
§0:5
Ãµ
a1
±
d
_
½
dK
_
K +a2
¶2
¡ 4a1a2 d
_
½
dK
_
K
!1=2
and
³3;4 =
1
2±
Ã
@ h½1
@K
_
K1 +
_
½1
!
(69)
§
0
@ 1
4±2
Ã
@ h½1
@K
_
K1 +
_
½1
!2
¡ 4 _C1 @
h½1
@K1
1
A
1=2
:
Because @ h½1 =@K1 < 0, the last two eigenvalues are real numbers and can be ranked
as follows:
³3 < 0 < ³4: (70)
The …rst two eigenvalues are evaluated as follows:
³1 < 0 < ³2; (71)
if
d
_
½
dK
< 0; (72)
and
Re (³1) > 0; (73)
Re (³2) > 0;
if
d
_
½
dK
> 0: (74)
Note that condition (72) is ful…lled in cases (i), (ii), and (iii) of proposition 2, whereas
condition (74) is equivalent to the condition described in case (iv) of proposition 2
which follows from proposition 1.
Because the matrices A and B have the same characteristic polynomials (Lemma 2),
the qualitative local stability properties are preserved by the transformation from the
linnearization of system (63) to the linnearization of system (21)-(24). In particular,
there exist two positive and two negative eigenvalues for system (21)-(24) in the cases
(i), (ii), and (iii) of proposition 2 and 3 positive and 1 negative eigenvalue in case (iv).
There correspond stable (unstable) eigenvectors to the stable (unstable) eigenvalues.
By the stable manifold theorem, the local stable manifolds for the local steady states
x¤; x¤¤; and x¤¤¤ of cases (i), (ii), and (iii) are two-dimensional (i.e. a surface in R4),
whereas the local stable manifold for x¤ in case (iv) is one-dimensional.
Next, it follows from case 1 in Buiter (1984) that a unique solution to the boundary
value problem (21)-(26) exists and is stable in cases (i), (ii), and (iii), because the
number of positive eigenvalues is equal to the number of control (jump-) variables
(C1; C2).
The boundary value problem (21)-(26) does not have a solution in case (iv), unless
we give up one initial condition. Giving up the initial condition for K2 (0) = K20 and
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letting K2 “jump”, yields again a unique and stable solution. If we inspect (68), we
see that these are the eigenvalues of the dynamical subsystem (29) which determines
convergence/non-convergence of K towards the steady state
_
K. If these eigenvalues
are both positive, there will not be convergence of K. Therefore we guess that the
system (21)-(26) must be restricted in K2 (0), such that relative capital ratios are in
their steady state right from the beginning. Formally, we guess that
K1 (0) = K2 (0) = (75)
will have to hold for any 2 R+. For any time st , there exists a s2 R+ such that
K1
³s
t
´
=s : By the property of autonomous di¤erential equation systems,
s
t can be
normalized to zero. Therefore, (75) implies that
K1 (t) = K2 (t) (76)
for t ¸ 0. From the …rst equation of (28) follows then that
C1 (t) = C2 (t) (77)
for t ¸ 0: Furthermore, from (16), (17), and (76) follows that p (t) = 1 for t ¸ 0:
The system (21)-(24) collapses to the system of two independent neoclassical growth
models. Therefore, the guess in form of condition (75) is valid and yields indeed a
stable solution to the boundary value problem (21)-(26) without the initial condition
K2 (0) = K20. Q.E.D.
Appendix 5: Proof of proposition 3.
We start out with equations (21) and (23). They can be integrated taken Cj (0), and
½j (t) to be well-de…ned (though unknown) functions of time t as given (Note: Cj (0)
is to be solved for.):
Cj (t) = Cj (0) e
tR
0
(½j(s)¡¸)ds: (78)
Integrating in the same way (22) and (24) yields
Ki (0) =
1Z
0
Ci (t) e
¡ tR
0
1
± ½i(s)dsdt; (79)
where we made use of the intitial condition (25) and the transversality condition (26).
Plugging (78) into (79) yields:
Cj (0) = ¹j (0)Kj (0) ; (80)
where
¹j (0) =
0
@
1Z
0
e
¡ tR
0
( 1¡±± )½j(s)+¸dsdt
1
A
¡1
:
(The three steps are standard in the literature, e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995),
p. 59¤., in a similar model.) Suppose now:
(i) K10 = K20 =
s;
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with any s2 R+. Suppose further that with this initial condition the steady state x¤¤
will be reached, i.e.:
(ii)
_
K1>
_
K2;
i.e.
_
K= K¤ < 1: Finally, we assume without loss of generality that K (0) K (s)
K¤ for 0 s 1.50 From this assumption and proposition 1 follows that
½1 (s) ¸ ½2 (s) (81)
for 0 s 1 and a strict inequality for some s. Consequently,
µ
1 ¡ ±
±
¶
½1 (s) + ¸ ¸
µ
1 ¡ ±
±
¶
½2 (s) + ¸ (82)
for 0 s 1 and a strict inequality for some s. One may check that this implies
¹1 (0) =
0
@
1Z
0
e
¡ tR
0
( 1¡±± )½1(s)+¸dsdt
1
A
¡1
>
0
@
1Z
0
e
¡ tR
0
(1¡±± )½2(s)+¸dsdt
1
A
¡1
= ¹2 (0) (83)
and therefore by equation (80) and assumption (i)
C1 (0) > C2 (0) : (84)
However, then follows from (28) and assumption (i) that
:
K1 (0) <
:
K2 (0) ; (85)
i.e.
:
K (0) > 0. Recall that K (0) = 1 (assumption i) and K¤ < 1. Therefore, the
direction of movement will always point away from the steady state K¤, if K (0) = 1:
By the properties of an autonomous di¤erential equation system, the trajectory to the
steady state can never pass the thresholdK = 1 at any point in time in the direction of
the steady state and therefore not reach the steady state. This contradicts assumption
(ii). Therefore, there is no perfect foresight path from the initial condition K (0) ¸ 1
to the steady stateK¤: By the symmetry property of the model, there is also no perfect
foresight path from the initial condition K (0) 1 to the steady state (1=K¤) : From
proposition 2 case (iv) follows that there exists a one-dimensional stable manifold such
that
_
K= 1 is reached, if K (0) = 1. This concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
50In other words: If K1 (s) = K2 (s) for s 2 fs0; s00; :::g, and s0 ¸ s00 ¸ ::: on the same trajectory
reaching x¤¤ (if it exists), then we normalize by the property of autonomous systems s0 = 0. Then
follows that K1 (s) > K2 (s) ;i.e. K (s) < 1, for s > 0, because s = 0 is the last point in time, where
K1 (s) = K2 (s) is sustained and before the steady state K¤ < 1 is reached. Furthermore, x¤¤ is a
stable node which follows from the proof of proposition 2. Therefore, the steady state value is not
“overshooted” (as would be the case for a stable focus), i.e. K (s) ¸ K¤ for s > 0.
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